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The relevance of Marx to contemporary perspectives on Utterance Meaning in 
Context: a re-examination of Voloshinov’s Philosophy of Language 
Abstract 
Philosophers on all sides of the contemporary Contextualism debates have given 
primacy to the role context plays in utterance comprehension. They view language as 
a socio-cultural practice; their theoretical perspectives are largely focused on 
speaker’s intentions and contextually modified senses of language elements 
appropriate to the situation at hand. Following Marx and Engels’ (1845) philosophical 
contributions on language, Voloshinov (1929: 9-24, 83-98) argues that language can 
only exist if socially organised individuals engage and communicate through the use 
of ‘signs’. The object of study should be the language of ‘actual life’, in other words 
utterances that carry meaning in existent social contexts, as well as interactions 
between interlocutors which alter and shift in real socio-historical conditions. The 
central tenet of this paper is to examine and advocate the use-value of language key to 
both contemporary philosophical thought on language and that of  
Marx. The latter however has had little or no impact on the former. Using 
Voloshinov’s (1929) framework, which gives primacy to the historical and social 
character of language, we argue for a (re)introduction of a Marxist Philosophy of 
Language into current philosophical debates as its contribution is essential in 
assessing the impact of language use on social consciousness.  
1.0 Introduction 
Contemporary philosophical debates on sentence meaning/speaker meaning, and the 
role of context in utterance comprehension, have moved on from the very early 
antagonisms associated with ‘ideal language philosophy’ and the camp of the so-
called ‘ordinary language philosophers’. The former gave rise to contemporary 
‘formal semantics’ and the latter contributed to the view currently known as 
‘Contextualism’ (for detail on both currents, see for example Bach 1999, Carston 
2007, Recanati 2002a and 2002b; Stainton 2010). Those early disagreements appear 
to have been settled on two accounts: semanticists have conceded that context-
sensitivity in natural language cannot be ignored; those working in pragmatics 
(Contextualists) appear no longer to hold that ‘meaning is use’, having been led by 
Grice to draw a distinction between what an expression means and what its use 
conveys in a particular context. Recently however there have been some attempts by 
‘Radical Contextualists’ to revisit the question of whether linguistic meanings 
necessarily serve as ‘input’ to the contextual construction process. This sceptical view 
is representative of Austin and Wittgenstein according to which “truth-conditional 
content is…unstable and context-dependent” (Recanati 2004: 141)1. The 
‘construction’ process can thus proceed without the help of conventional word 
meanings. This development is important and I will address it in more detail later on. 
                                                1 Austin	  and	  Wittgenstein	  are	  the	  most	  frequently	  recognised	  predecessors	  of	  contemporary	  Radical	  Contextualism.	  Their	  ideas	  can	  be	  recognised	  in	  the	  more	  contemporary	  works	  of	  Radical	  Contextualists,	  such	  as	  Predelli	  (cf.	  2005),	  Recanati	  (cf.	  2000,	  2004,	  2007a,	  2007b),	  Travis	  (cf.	  1997,	  2008). 
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However, those philosophers of language who have abandoned Wittgenstein’s 
thinking and have firmly stuck with Grice (most of them), have since the mid 
1970s/early 1980s undergone sustained critical scrutiny by ‘Integrational linguists’ 
who claim that “a theory of language must be developed within a theory of 
communication” (Hutton 2011: 475). The integrationist position was pioneered by 
Harris (1981, 1996, 1998) who did not accept the Gricean distinction between 
‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’ meaning, emphasising the need for a broader conception of 
use that better captures the necessary links between verbal and non-verbal 
communication during participants’ exchanges. For Harris, identifying types of 
meaning independently of context is a non-starter: signs are always made by the 
participants and sign-making is reflective of individuals’ “communicational 
proficiency” (Harris 1998: 44). Thus ‘mind reading’ (commonly presupposed in 
contemporary philosophy of language, in particular perhaps in Relevance Theoretic 
accounts of utterance meaning in context), is heavily criticised as it rests on the 
assumption that thoughts, ideas, meanings are somehow transmitted between different 
minds, a process Harris (1981, 1996) calls ‘telementation’. This telementational 
position is consequent upon the premise that meanings are semantically pre-
established (to a point) but that their more specific ‘values’ arise as a result of a 
particular communicative situation. Both of these claims are rejected by 
Integrationists outright: ‘values’, they claim, are assigned as part of the integration of 
activities involved since communication is the basis upon which continuous making 
and re-making of meanings takes place. ‘Segregationists’, as Harris calls them, appear 
to be charged with the following: (a) their distinction between ‘what is said’ and 
‘what is meant’ (as in all Gricean-type accounts) leads back to ‘mind-
reading’/’telementation’ which necessarily assumes some level of conventional word 
meaning; and (b) the distinction in (a) is reflective of ‘intention’ based models of 
communication which assume that participants can somehow predict 
communicational processes that are to happen. Harris and others claim that in 
‘normal’ communicative settings quite the opposite is the case; it is the 
communication amongst participants that creates contexts – these are unique and 
develop all the time as communication itself develops. Participants therefore do not 
share “conceptual or perceptual content” (Jones 2016: 36). 
 
For Marxists interested in critical language research and communication, such 
divergences between approaches to language create space for reviving important 
debates on the use-value of language and therefore ‘the social’ element in language 
theory. This is because such approaches, in different ways, attempt to understand and 
examine progressive transformations of social life, and by so doing place language in 
a central position in relation to social change. Philosophically, as already illustrated, 
this is mainly achieved by exploring the role of utterances in communicative settings 
and examining communication at key moments in the process of social change where 
the object of study should be real life language use.  These social, and historical, 
dimensions of language (largely labelled ‘context’, often ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ context 
in contemporary philosophy of language) can be clearly detected in Voloshinov’s 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Here, language is not an abstract system; 
its use in concrete social contexts, and thus utterances used in concrete situations, 
should be the object of our study.  
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With this prelude in mind, the key aim of this paper is to contribute to the current 
debates in philosophy of language by arguing that Voloshinov’s position on meaning 
and use in language continues to have currency and deserves a more prominent place 
on the contemporary philosophical scene. This is both to critically (re)engage with 
Marx and contribute further to our understanding of the role of context in language 
use. In doing so, perhaps two other aims might be considered: i) showing that perhaps 
Integrational Linguistics and (Radical) Contextualism have something in common 
that is also shared with Voloshinov’s framework; and ii) using real language examples 
to illustrate how those moments of actual social change are registered in ‘the word’ 
(following Voloshinov). With the second point I aim to show how redefined meanings 
are ever present in a society marked by inequalities, and how those meanings in 
frequently changing contexts impact on our social consciousness in moments of 
struggle. I will illustrate this shift by drawing on the 2010 student protests in the UK.  
2.0 ‘The social’ in language theories 
I begin by giving a brief account of an example I wish to use throughout to illustrate 
real life language use and the significance of socio-political and historical contexts. 
The example comes from the work of a grassroots campaign set up in 2010/11 as a 
consequence of mass student protests in the UK. Students took to the streets to protest 
against tripling of tuition fees and abolition of the Education Maintenance Allowance2 
by the then Coalition government (Conservatives and Liberal Democrats). The 
campaign’s main focus3 was to challenge unlawful policing, and provide support and 
advice for student protesters who found themselves at the mercy of brutal policing 
tactics which left many severely injured. The campaign also focused on exposing a 
persistent campaign of intimidation by, disproportionate charges brought against 
students by the Crown Prosecution Service and a long smear campaign in the media4. 
Following Voloshinov’s theoretical framework and drawing on Collins’s (1996, 
1999) analysis of the link between language and its socio-political and historical 
contexts, language extracts will show the development and shifting of the narrative of 
‘violence’. The data will assist in registering a redefinition of meaning at the moment 
of a particular struggle and in exposing the ways in which language is deployed by 
powerful minorities with the intention of marginalising the majority. More 
specifically, the language examples will show an initial portrayal of protesters as a 
‘violent mob’ (via a media smearing campaign) and then a shift in that narrative, 
largely achieved through tireless campaigning and exposure of evidence in court 
which resulted in acquittals of the majority of students. The shift in narrative, and the 
discourse around an interpretation of visual evidence during court hearings, 
eventually exposed the deployment of violent tactics by the police.  
                                                
2 Education	  Maintenance	  Allowance	  is	  a	  financial	  scheme	  applicable	  to	  students	  and	  those	  undertaking	  unpaid	  work-­‐based	  learning	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  16	  and	  19	  whose	  parents	  had	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  taxable	  income.	  It	  was	  abolished	  in	  England	  in	  2010;	  it	  is	  still	  available	  in	  Wales,	  Scotland	  and	  Northern	  Ireland.	  	  
3 Details	  of	  the	  ‘Defend	  the	  Right	  to	  Protest	  (DtRtP)’	  Campaign’s	  work	  and	  activities	  can	  be	  found	  here:	  www.defendtherighttoprotest.org 4	  All	  information	  and	  materials	  used	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  publicly	  available	  via	  websites,	  other	  publications	  and	  public	  reports.	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2.1 Role of utterances 
In the 1929 Russian publication of Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, 
Voloshinov sets out a Marxist account of language, firmly rooted in the historical 
materialist method of analysis. In particular, Voloshinov began from the philosophical 
position advanced by Marx and Engels (1845: 51) two centuries earlier according to 
which language is humans’ concrete, “practical consciousness” and which, 
Voloshinov argues (1929), can only exist if socially organised individuals engage and 
communicate through the use of ‘signs’. From this perspective, language use is 
inherently social and historical in nature. Language itself, therefore, is not to be 
understood as an abstract entity (more indicative of the position of ‘ideal language 
philosophy’); rather, our concern should be with the actual use of language in 
concrete situations and social contexts.  This position has a number of distinctive and 
significant consequences for how we might understand the production of linguistic 
meaning. 
 
Firstly, the object of study for Voloshinov is an ‘utterance’; utterances are concrete 
manifestations of language use. They are spoken by living subjects, located within a 
specific social and historical perspective, and, importantly, are addressed to others as 
responses to their utterances. The focus on utterances thus reveals the various 
processes of change, shifts and developments “without which language would have no 
history to speak of” (Collins 2000: 44). Relatedly, meaning, as embodied in word, is 
therefore a product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, 
addresser and addressee (Voloshinov 1986: 99-106). This reciprocity entails a 
dialogicality of the utterance on two levels: utterances are spoken by “living subjects” 
in concrete social contexts (Collins 1996: 74), and at the same time represent verbal 
interaction between interlocutors in continually shifting real socio-historical 
conditions. Thus, “verbal interaction is the basic reality of language” (Voloshinov 
1986: 94). 
There are important similarities between this aspect of Voloshinov’s work and 
contemporary Contextualist positions on utterance meaning. The key similarity rests 
on the role utterances play in communication, and more specifically in that their 
interpretation is taken to be context-dependent. Thus context (real, concrete 
situations) plays a vital part in the working out of a reciprocal relationship between a 
speaker and a hearer, including the working out by each participant of the meaning of 
the other’s utterances. The circumstances under which utterances are produced 
necessarily form an essential element in utterance comprehension. These 
circumstances are also central for the assignment of truth conditional content of 
utterances, an essential formal element of (Radical) Contextualist frameworks. 
Importantly, the Radical Contextualist position considers truth-conditional content 
unstable, in other words entirely context/situation/discourse-dependent (Recanati 
2004: 146-151). Its instability is therefore entirely down to transitions and shifts of 
circumstances. Radical Contextualist frameworks on language and communication 
(cf. Recanati 2004, 2007a) suggest, arguably in the spirit of Voloshinov, that word 
meanings are susceptible to variation, pretty much indefinitely. Words are associated 
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with situations of use, nothing else. Thus to define the meaning of a word is to 
describe the type of situation in question. Recanati’s (2004) radical philosophy of 
language recognises therefore the importance of communicative devices in shaping 
particular contexts. 
Arguably, in this respect Voloshinov’s position might be closer to the Integrationist 
point of view on utterance meaning in context (e.g. Harris 1996; 1998). On such a 
reading, context should not be conceived of in terms of a previously construed setting; 
rather, it is the participants themselves who are part of the context and who make it 
what it is by their engagement through various activities. Context is not given but 
constructed by the participants engaged in the communication process itself: 
“communication creates contexts” (Harris 1996: 163).  
Nonetheless, what is missing from both Radical Contextualism and Integrationism is, 
first, an explicit recognition and, second, an analysis of the social and historical nature 
of language use which would help expose the traces of power and domination in 
language and the conflicts associated with them. Whilst the dialogical character of 
language in Voloshinov’s sense is generally assumed in both endeavours, what is 
clearly only present in Voloshinov’s framework is his dialectical conception of 
language through which he emphasises the inherently social and historical character 
of language. 
To illustrate the theoretical issues at stake in the construction of context by 
participants let us turn to the case study example. The criminalisation of student 
protesters that took place after the 2010 protests was based on a reconstruction of the 
political narrative of the protest, a reconstruction which, for a significant period of 
time, masked how police violence contributed to shaping that narrative. The use of the 
Public Order Act 1986 against protesters had significant political implications because 
it diverted public attention away from the political message of the protesters. Instead, 
they were presented as having engaged in disorderly and criminal behaviour. This 
construal of context prevailed in the media reporting, both in right-wing and more 
liberal newspapers. Below are extracts which highlight a particular choice of 
vocabulary used in media reporting at the time to channel the narrative away from the 
reasons why protesters took to the streets and towards discourses which any ‘morally 
responsible agents’ would condemn. In particular, we see the use of metaphorical 
expressions “the siege” (of Millbank) and protesters “forcing” their way inside, 
commonly present in ‘war’ metaphors. This illustrates the narrative of violence and 
aggression used by the media to divert attention from the issues facing the education 
system at the time. Similarly, an adjectivally modified phrase “violent break-away” 
and adjectives “masked and hooded” help focus the reader on the disorderly and 
criminal behaviour of protesters. The reporting of “missiles raining down” and police 
being “outnumbered and overwhelmed” resembles a kind of reporting typical of war 
situations where one side are the losers and the other are winners. Continuing with the 
‘battle’ theme, we note a description of the police being “relentlessly hemmed against 
the front of the building”, indicating an intentional construction of a context involving 
violent, unruly and dangerous protesters. Here are the extracts:   
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The siege of the Millbank office complex, ending with the smashing of the 
windows and the occupation of the building, was a violent break-away from 
what had until then been a noisy but good-natured march against raising tuition 
fees. 
-------------------------------- 
Missiles thrown 
As more people crowded around the building, including some masked and 
hooded demonstrators, the mood changed. It became clear that there was going 
to be an attempt by some demonstrators to force their way inside. 
Missiles began to fly towards the large plate glass windows across the front of 
the building… 
Outnumbered and overwhelmed, this line of policemen was slowly but 
relentlessly hemmed against the front of the building, missiles raining down on 
them. 
BBC, 11 Nov 2010 
 
Underlined elements above illustrate Voloshinov’s view of the role of the word as 
“the most sensitive index of social change” (Voloshinov 1986: 19). In its process of 
growth, without a pre-determined shape, the word has “the capacity to register all the 
transitional elements and momentary phases of social change” (Voloshinov 1986: 19). 
Countless past examples of social conflict, in addition to the above, have shown that 
protest is embarrassing for any government. It is a loud, visible manifestation of 
dissent and discontent. Thus, the extracts above, and those further on, direct the 
reading public (conceivably shaping their views as a consequence) towards a 
representation of demonstrators who throw ‘missiles’, ‘force’ entrance, invoking a 
stereotype of those who ‘mask up’ or wear ‘hooded’ clothing and whose messages 
cannot be considered legitimate or serious, thereby diverting the public’s attention 
away from the issues at hand.   
The media reports below are also constructed narratives since these continue in the 
spirit of the representation of protesters illustrated in the above examples; only this 
time these representations appear to be further legitimised since they come from 
elected Members of Parliament, from ostensibly incontestable CCTV footage, and 
from eye witnesses. Underlined elements in the texts demonstrate that the focus on the 
criminality aspect of protesters’ behaviour is particularly prominent with such 
adjectivally modified phrases “violent faction”, “criminal acts”; and noun phrases 
“the criminals” and “this violence”.  The second extract from the Telegraph is perhaps 
even more interesting since it appears to adopt an informal style of reporting akin to 
the British tabloid press, reporting a judgement without trial of “the culprits”. The 
readership is directed towards a perception that the “criminal acts” were pre-planned: 
the noun phrase “snarling faces” certainly hints at a pre-meditated action on the part 
of “the hooligans”. The political narrative we spoke of above around the 2010 student 
protest can also be detected in the reference to  “anarchist slogans” in the extract. The 
newspaper does not specify or clarify the nature of the slogans, or how one would go 
about identifying what these might be. However in historical terms, anarchism is 
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primarily associated with absolute disregard for the rule of law, thus solidifying 
further the now familiar descriptions of the protesters and ignoring the politics of the 
educational agenda of the Coalition Government at the time.  
 
David Cameron has called for the ''full force of the law'' to be used against 
people who assaulted police or damaged property during protests about student 
tuition fees. 
Outlining yesterday's events to MPs, Mr Herbert said a ''violent faction'' had 
''directed a series of criminal acts'' against the office complex on Millbank 
following the demonstration. 
'The police are committed to bringing the criminals who carried out this 
violence in front of a court,'' Mr Herbert said. 
The Telegraph 11 Nov 2010 
Hundreds of hours of CCTV and television news footage will be studied, 
together with thousands of photographs, by officers trying to put names to the 
snarling faces of the culprits. 
  
Witnesses said many of the hooligans who destroyed the ground floor of the 
building and sprayed anarchist slogans on the walls had left by the time police 
gained control of the situation and made arrests. 
The Telegraph 12 Nov 2010 
The Telegraph’s reporting of ‘hooligan’-style, ‘violent’ behaviour by ‘criminals’ who 
must be brought in front of a court may have contributed to the launching of criminal 
prosecutions under the Public Order Act 1986, in particular through the charge of 
Violent Disorder which carries a maximum term of five years’ imprisonment. Its use 
represents a practice of ‘over-charging’ by the police and the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS).5 At the time, pressure was placed on individuals to plead guilty, 
leading to students receiving unjustified or disproportionate sentences as part of a 
wider programme of deterrence and intimidation. Alongside the narrative exemplified 
above, in which the language of the minority elite is deployed to marginalise and 
subordinate the majorities in their attempts to influence social change, was the 
practice of heavy-handed, often violent policing which took place during those 
events.6  
However, despite many attempts by the media (and the UK Government via the 
media) to present the narrative we have analysed, an alternative perception of the 
                                                5	  Details	  of	  research	  and	  case	  studies	  undertaken	  to	  show	  this	  trend,	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  following	  websites:	  https://greenandblackcross.org/	  (Green	  and	  Black	  Cross)	  http://ldmg.org.uk/	  (Legal	  Defence	  and	  Monitoring	  Group)	  6	  Further	  information	  can	  be	  found	  here:	  https://static1.squarespace.com/static/562e7d33e4b0da14ad6d202f/t/566f1b065a5668815911b14d/1450121990831/SocialistLawyer58.pdf	  (pages	  12-­‐17)	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2010 student protest was being shaped by the events that surrounded a protester who 
underwent life-saving emergency brain surgery after being hit on the head by a police 
baton; he was at the same time charged (later acquitted) with violent disorder. The 
now iconic images of the student’s injuries and postoperative trauma that flooded 
social media, and eventually saturated the more traditional news channels, continue to 
signify the face of brutal and unlawful policing. 7 A similar media narrative was 
constructed around another student. Once again, the discourse was shaped using the 
familiar theme of violent and hooligan-style behaviour. In the media reporting of this 
case (a continuation of the extract above), the Prime Minister at the time, David 
Cameron, claimed that the police were “dragged off horses and beaten”.8 In section 
2.3 I will discuss the outcome of this particular case as part of the discussion of the 
contestable nature of language in practice.  
2.2 ‘We all speak the same language’ 
Voloshinov argues that in any society groups with profoundly different viewpoints 
share a single language. When they speak, different meanings are produced by the use 
of the same words. The word therefore “sensitively reflects the slightest variation in 
social existence” (1986: 23). Competing meanings within a sign community are 
differentiated by differently oriented social interests, in other words “by the class 
struggle” (1986: 23). His comment in full: 
Class does not coincide with the sign community, i.e. with the community 
which is the totality of users of the same set of signs for ideological 
communication. Thus various different classes will use one and the same 
language. As a result, differently oriented accents intersect in every 
ideological sign…The ruling class strives to impart a supraclass, eternal 
character to the ideological sign, to extinguish or drive inward the struggle 
between social value judgments which occurs in it, to make the sign 
uniaccentual…In actual fact, each living ideological sign has two faces, like 
Janus. Any current curse word can become a word of praise, any current truth 
must inevitably sound to many people as the greatest lie.  
(Voloshinov 1986: 23) 
The ‘coincidence’ of social class and language use is thus most clear in periods of 
social crisis when it truly becomes an “arena of class struggle” and helps expose the 
                                                7	  Detailed	  information	  of	  Alfie	  Meadows	  case	  and	  iconic	  images	  of	  his	  injures	  can	  be	  found	  here:	  	  https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/8201657/Theresa-­‐May-­‐faces-­‐questions-­‐over-­‐injured-­‐Alfie-­‐Meadows.html	  https://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/mar/08/student-­‐tuition-­‐fees-­‐cleared-­‐disorder	  https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-­‐news/alfie-­‐meadows-­‐calls-­‐on-­‐ipcc-­‐to-­‐re-­‐open-­‐investigation-­‐into-­‐student-­‐protest-­‐8529544.html	  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/10/student-­‐operation-­‐tuition-­‐fees-­‐protest?INTCMP=SRCH	  https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/dec/12/police-­‐injured-­‐protester-­‐hospital?INTCMP=SRCH	  http://defendtherighttoprotest.org/files/images/dtrtp_justice_for_alfie_meadows_highres.jpg	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSfdHvT0fZY	  8	  Information	  about	  the	  case	  can	  be	  found	  here:	  	  https://www.channel4.com/news/met-­‐police-­‐compensates-­‐brothers-­‐caught-­‐up-­‐in-­‐protests	  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/sep/23/cameron-­‐urged-­‐apologise-­‐student-­‐tuition-­‐fees-­‐protesters-­‐compensation-­‐hilliard	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conflict between the oppressed and those in a position of power who “seek to prevent 
and inhibit the development and dissemination of forms of speaking which might 
penetrate their claims to legitimacy” (Collins 2000: 44). Voloshinov’s arguments play 
out in the example of the 2010 education demonstrations and their aftermath. 
Particular connotations attached to the vocabulary of violence – the ‘unruly’, 
‘immoral’ behaviour of ‘hooded’, ‘anarchist’ ‘hooligans’ with ‘snarling faces’ - serve 
to mask the competing meanings of the communicative and other actions of students’ 
and lecturers’ groups. Moreover, those ‘singular’ meanings, constructed within a 
particular narrative that inhibits diversity of opinion, serve to reinforce the political 
agenda of the powerful groups, in this case the police working together with the state, 
both to create a biased narrative where the police are the victims and the protesters are 
the perpetrators, and to use such a narrative to justify the implementation of policing 
strategies on the ground that undermined the demonstrators’ basic democratic rights 
to express dissent through protesting.  
Many authors who have examined Voloshinov’s work commonly point to his 
rejection of ‘abstract objectivism’ and of the existence of linguistic form as an 
abstract entity capable of surviving as a historically and socially isolated entity. 
Linguistic form, he argues, is only possible in the context of specific utterances, 
which in turn only exist in a specific ideological context. “Words”, he says, “are 
always filled with content and meaning drawn from behaviour or ideology”; we never 
say or hear ‘words’ – “we say and hear what is true or false, good or bad, important or 
unimportant, pleasant or unpleasant, and so on” (1986: 70).  In this respect too there is 
no doubt that he is arguing for the inherently social nature of language: the context 
sensitivity of utterances is reflected in the “contestable” nature of language (Collins 
1996:  75), in other words issues pertinent to a particular social group unsurprisingly 
reflect their own social position and perspective. Utterances therefore carry distinctive 
“evaluative accents”: a change in meaning is always a re-valuation.  
Similarities between Voloshinov’s position and both Radical Contextualist and 
Integrationist positions are in my view visible. Within the realm of ‘Situation 
Theory’, for example, a Radical Contextualist would argue that the truth-conditional 
content of any utterance is unstable and context-dependent (Recanati 2004). 
Moreover, we should look for context-dependence in the circumstances of utterance 
and it is this that has a bearing on the context-dependence of utterance content – a ‘top 
down’ picture that evidently gives primacy to context over content, much like the 
Integrationist approach in some respects. In order to perform any semantic evaluation, 
we necessarily need to evaluate and re-evaluate the circumstances in which utterances 
are used rather than a putative semantic meaning of words or utterance (Recanati 
2000). This theoretical premise leads toward the conclusion that defining word 
meaning can only be achieved by describing the type of situation in which words are 
used. From this point of view, we would not need to take issue with the 
Integrationists’ claim that context develops as the communication process itself 
develops, which makes each context (and each process) unique, but which conversely 
does not “prevent specific features of the situation from remaining constant 
throughout” (Harris: 1996: 163).  
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The uniqueness of the situation (along with its specific features) is also what Radical 
Contextualists consider sufficient as far as the interpretation of a ‘sign’ is concerned. 
Since words are only associated with situations of use, and thus only contribute a 
“semantic potential” in a communicative exchange, they have to draw their ever-
changing meanings from somewhere. Accordingly, very much in the spirit of 
Wittgenstein, the theoretical position of Radical Contextualism is made up of the 
following ingredients: i) the role of ‘similarity’ between ‘source’ and ‘target’ 
situations (historical contexts and re-emerging, re-evaluated circumstances); ii) the 
context-dependence of similarity relations; and iii) the rejection of abstract meanings 
or ‘types’ in favour of particular uses (of words).  
Let us develop these points in a little more detail. For the first point, I take an example 
from Recanati (2004: 148). A learner of a predicate, let us say P, observes an 
application of P in a particular situation S. In a new situation, S’, the learner might 
conclude that P only applies if S’ is sufficiently similar to S. It is equally possible 
however that the similarity between S and S’ as it appears to the learner does not 
render the use of P in S’ appropriate for the community at large who might therefore 
reject or correct the learner’s usage. In this situation the learner’s use of P will 
therefore be subject to adjustment. The process could go on indefinitely (following 
our earlier point that word senses are susceptible to variation, pretty much 
indefinitely) and thus at some point towards the end of a learning phase a learner 
might draw the conclusion that a semantic potential of P is a “collection of legitimate 
situations of applications” (Recanati 2004: 148) where some level of similarity exists 
with respect to the conditions of applications of P (not fixed meanings) between the 
‘source’ situations (S, S’) and a given ‘target’ situation (let us say S’’ or S’’’).  
On the second point above, the dimensions of application between the source and 
target situations continue to be in flux and are underdetermined because the 
dimensions can continue to vary depending on the situations participants find 
themselves in. As for the third point, the theory of Meaning Eliminativism, as a 
radical view within Contextualism (Recanati 2004: 146-151; Hintzman 1986), would 
insist on disregarding any alleged input from the ‘linguistic meaning’ of the 
expression type entirely and would favour an account where communication rests on 
computing a contextual sense of an expression arrived at purely through its use on a 
particular occasion on the basis of possible contextual senses the expression had in 
previous situations. On this view, words are not associated with conventional, 
linguistic meaning as abstract entities; words are associated with particular 
contextually determined applications (Douglas 1986, 1988; Recanati 2000, 2004). 
Perhaps for Integrationists this position still doesn’t go far enough: Radical 
Contextualists stop short of the integrationist position of ‘radical indeterminacy’: 
“[l]anguage is radically indeterminate, as regards both what is meant and what is 
said” (Love 1990: 105). Furthermore, the Radical Contextualist frameworks still 
arguably represent inconsistencies as far as the distinction between narrow and wide 
context is concerned. Harris (1996: 162) acknowledges Firth’s (1957) distinction 
between immediate context and ‘a contextualisation of that context’ (which Firth calls 
“sociological linguistics”) as an attempt to rescue the ‘context of situation’ in 
language theory. Harris however has issue with where one type of context begins and 
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the other ends. Many Contextualist theories have since offered a number of 
possibilities as to how our conscious and unconscious levels of processing rely on 
various types of contextual information to explain processing mechanisms and 
reliance on wider context in communicative processes (cf. for example Recanati 
2007b on primary and secondary pragmatic processes). All this still probably places 
them in the camp of what the Integrationists would refer to as  “weak 
segregationism”, the view that  “the relevant communicational unit is not the sign as 
defined by the linguistic code, but, in practice, the sign-in-its-context” (Harris 1996: 
147). Nevertheless, it seems to me that much progress has been made on the side of 
contemporary philosophy of language in considering and adjusting to the position that 
a theory of language use cannot be divorced from a theory of communication. 	  
 
2.3 The contestable nature of language in practice: the impact of language use on 
social consciousness 
In this section we return to our protest theme and the data analysis. Many defence 
campaigns and organisations (amongst them NETPOL – the Network which monitors 
public order, protest and community policing that is excessive, discriminatory or 
threatens civil rights), Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers, Defend the Right to 
Protest Campaign, many MPs including Caroline Lucas (Green Party) and a 
considerable number of MPs now occupying positions in the Labour Shadow Cabinet, 
including its leader and the Shadow Chancellor) contributed towards, and were 
largely successful in, contesting the widely accepted narrative of this period of student 
protest. This is evident on two accounts: the acquittal of the majority of protesters, 
and the relative acceptance of an alternative narrative by the mainstream media. The 
eventual success of this counter-narrative was also consequent upon an exposure of 
emerging evidence presented in court hearings and the exposition of inaccuracies and 
untruths reported in the media. The extracts in previous sections are a testimony to the 
persistent narrative of violence according to which aggressive actions were exhibited 
solely on the side of the protesters, thus any retaliation from the police was described 
as ‘defence’ and ‘protection’ as mechanisms in preventing harm and injury to 
themselves. Readdressing the balance of that narrative required commitment and 
strength on the part of many militant activists. It should additionally be noted that 
tireless and persistent work of defence campaigns was the key precursor in raising 
awareness of these injustices amongst Members of Parliament and legal firms as the 
vehicle through which the alternative narrative of the events could penetrate through 
the mainstream media and consequently force the Government to reconsider its own 
narrative. We see here a multi-layered set of actions that illustrate differences, shifts 
and processes of flux in language-use in the continuous battle to re-evaluate contexts 
and reframe the meanings of the terms that for a long time masked the conflict and 
inhibited the re-development and re-thematisation of meanings antagonistic to the 
Government.  
 
During the period of the Coalition Government (2010-2015), the heavy police 
presence, use of a ‘kettling’ (containment) technique and other forms of targeted 
violence against protesters became a common sight at demonstrations. The frequent 
use of kettling requires officers to surround demonstrators in a confined space 
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allowing only small numbers out after a lengthy delay. During the student protests in 
question, kettled demonstrators were held for hours at a time without food, water, or 
provision of basic sanitary needs. The ambiguous description and similarity in 
definition of the three most serious charges under the Public Order Act 1986, Riot, 
Violent Disorder and Affray, which carry a maximum sentence of 10, 5 and 3 years 
respectively, has meant that each charge could be appropriate in some most unlikely 
of events, even applying, for example, to a bystander on a protest. Demonstrators 
faced charges of Violent Disorder for throwing placard sticks in and around the crowd 
(defined as ‘missiles’ both in the prosecution evidence and the media narratives), and 
for being within crowds from which placard sticks and empty water bottles were 
thrown.  
Persistent public exposure of police tactics and behaviour contributed to bringing back 
the necessary diversity of language use where containment of the dominant narratives 
by the minority was proving challenging. The social conflicts, not just through 
demonstrations but now also through language-use, created conditions in which it was 
possible to contest and refine those received meanings (e.g. the miners’ strike at 
Orgreave, the Hillsborough tragedy, ‘Black Lives Matter’ campaigns in the UK and 
the United States). Thus, Voloshinov’s methodology of studying discursively 
expressed social conflict enables us to notice shifts in language use as indicators of 
change in human consciousness, and so social change.  
Changes in language used also reflected and contributed to the emergent bravery of 
some family members of arrested protestors whose confidence to speak to the media 
grew with time. By going to the newspapers they contributed to the re-evaluation of 
previously unchallengeable episodes of police conduct (the extract from a parent’s 
testimony appeared in the BBC’s and Channel 4’s reporting of the student’s 
acquittal). In the extract below we also see examples of the vocabulary associated 
with violence and criminalisation but this time from a different perspective: 
importantly, the evidence presented in court hearings contributed to reshaping the 
previously deeply-rooted narrative. Below we see that the acts of “criminalisation” 
and “victimisation” are attributed to the police and the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS). Here, the protesters are described as “peaceful” and “kettled” (a technique 
condemned in the reconstruction of the narrative associated with the 2010 events and 
exemplified elsewhere in the paper); “police tactics” are described as “violent” 
instead. We further see this growing confidence in the counter-narrative in the way in 
which a pursuit of “justice” is repeated a number of times in the extract, involving an 
“ordeal” and a “fight” to “clear” students’ names. Arguably, this extract is an 
excellent example of how the language used ‘meets’ changes in social consciousness 
taking place through real life struggles.  
The struggle for justice for my son has finally begun. Today a jury has delivered 
a unanimous verdict acquitting [him] of violent disorder…. 
[Two students] had to wait more than two years and go through the ordeal of 
three trials to clear their names. Meanwhile the trial has taken a heavy toll on 
both [of their] families… 
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The trial has also exposed the same pattern of criminalisation and victimisation 
by the police and CPS, which we also saw played out in the cases of the 
Hillsborough tragedy and the miners’ strike at Orgreave. 
[My son] suffered a baton blow to the head…which required life-saving brain 
surgery. While the police have so far escaped any form of accountability for 
their actions, [he] was charged with violent disorder and has had to fight to 
clear his name before finally beginning the road to justice. 
Of the 15 protesters who pleaded not guilty to charges of violent disorder 
relating to the 9 December 2010 demonstration, so far 14 have been found not 
guilty. In a time of unprecedented cuts to public funding, it is atrocious that the 
police and the CPS have wasted resources in the pursuit of criminalising 
protesters. 
The trial has allowed us to scrutinise what happened on the day of the protest. 
The peaceful and kettled protesters were charged at with horses and subjected 
to indiscriminate baton use. When [my son’s barrister] challenged… a senior 
officer in charge of the ground operation on the day, on whether their batons 
had been used as a last resort, his reply was that the use of a machine gun 
against protesters would have been the last resort. It transpired that police also 
considered the use of rubber bullets against the student protesters. 
The treatment of [my son] and other student protesters stands in stark contrast 
to the failure to hold any officers to account for violent police tactics or injuries 
sustained by protesters. In the wake of this verdict we are reminded that we 
must fight together to defend our right to protest and for justice for all victims of 
police violence. 
The struggle for justice for my son has finally begun. The whole family has been 
through two years of total agony. We have been silenced on what happened to 
our son. We can now move on to the really important thing, which is to get 
justice…9 
The following extract, which comes from a defendant’s partner, illustrates the 
psychological effect of state oppression. It further helps us grasp what Voloshinov 
called ‘the contestable nature of language’, helping us understand the dynamics of this 
contest (Collins 1996). Thus, anything that is significant to the life of a social group is 
subject to their evaluation, from the point of view of their own social position. 
Corresponding to the Radical Contextualist position exemplified in previous 
paragraphs, Voloshinov’s framework too emphases the evaluative nature of utterances 
and the importance of changing evaluations which are contextually determined. There 
are at least two evident juxtapositions in the ‘testimony’ below: one between an 
individual and the state, and another between “the mental” and “the social”. With 
regards to the former, ‘the protester’ is now described as an “isolated individual”, 
                                                
9 8th	  March	  2013:	  http://www.defendtherighttoprotest.org 
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“named”, “stripped of any context”. This is in stark contrast with the state, 
“anonymous”, yet “with multiple faces”, in the form of the police, the guards and the 
prosecutors, all seeking to “penalise” the individual. The theme of “punishment” runs 
throughout the extract. The state oppression is further exposed in the latter 
juxtaposition where we see the exposition of the “profound structural wrongs” (the 
wrongs of the state and the social structures of course), which, from the social 
position of the said family member must not be dissociated from the “injury, stress 
and mental illness” for which the state is “directly” responsible, not just for the 
individual in question but “the broader social whole”. The theme of criminality also 
runs through the text, as has been the case with examples so far, but here it is used to 
contest the so far unchallenged Government and media narratives. Thus, here we see 
explicit reference to the police officer who hit the protester over the head with his 
truncheon and caused life-threating head injury; the exposure of the senior police 
officers’ false testimony, and their discussion of a possibility of using machine guns 
on protesters.   
Any supposed polarisation between ‘the mental’ and ‘the social’ is torn apart in 
situations where political activity puts you in direct confrontation with the state. 
When the state’s actions are directly responsible for injury, stress and mental 
illness, it is imperative that we do not dissociate one from the other. We cannot 
continue to blame individuals for profound structural wrongs. 
The individual is only a symptom of the broader social whole. For decades now, 
(anti-)psychiatrists, activists and political thinkers have said that mental health 
cannot be dissociated from the pathologies of the culture in which individuals 
are deemed to be unwell. 
I want to talk about the personal impact of a serious, prolonged encounter with 
the criminal justice system, and the collective impact this continues to have on 
friends and family. Above all, I want to stress that the way in which the state 
uses time as a method of punishing, even before it seeks to actually penalise  
you… 
This stretching out of time is a central feature of what punishment is, from the 
slowness of bringing someone to trial, to the trial process itself, to prison, the 
purest manifestation of time used as a weapon, against the very nature of what 
it means to be human. 
The implications for mental health, with the anonymous, seemingly indifferent 
state with its multiple faces - the police, the prosecutors, the guards - against 
isolated individuals, named, stripped of any context, are extreme: and it is 
always the most vulnerable who end up in the worst places, with around 70 per 
cent of prisoners suffering from two or more mental health disorders.  
In December 2010, my partner… was nearly killed by the police when an officer 
at an anti-tuition fees demo hit him over the head with a truncheon. 
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After recovering from the brain surgery that saved his life, he was charged with 
a serious public order offence. This was despite, or indeed, because of the fact 
that there was video footage of (and documentation relating to) the attack on 
him. 
Police bloggers nevertheless continued to spread disinformation that [he] had 
been hurt by another protester, repeatedly claiming that he had been hit by a 
concrete block. The frustration and anger about not being able to speak out 
about the truth of the situation online only made the situation more upsetting…. 
…. We were all suffering. Seeing the state up close, seeing senior police officers 
lie and discuss how they would have turned machine guns on protesters, how 
they had called for rubber bullets, how the students had ‘asked for it’ - was 
extremely distressing… 
When jury members cried at the footage of protesters being smashed with 
shields, hit with batons, charged with horses and crushed on Westminster 
Bridge we cried too, even though we had seen all the footage many times 
before… 
Shine A Light, 28 April 2014 
In the wake of student trials, increasing questioning of police conduct and the 
emergence of alternative narratives contesting the Government’s misrepresentation of 
facts, the media reporting moved to some extent from a discourse in which all protest 
inevitably leads to violence and criminality, to a relatively neutral reporting of the 
outcomes of the trials. That reporting included a range of testimonies and experiences 
of those close to the protesters (as above), as well as elements of interviews conducted 
with the protesters themselves so that their voices could finally be heard. Simon 
Israel, Channel 4’s Senior Home Affairs Correspondent at the time, was one of the 
few recognised figures in the media who took an interest in the cases in question. 
During one of the trials his report for Channel 4 exposed unacceptable police tactics, 
but stopped short of demanding any form of accountability from the police and the 
Government. His report on the acquittals of two protesters includes some recognition 
of the evidence of police aggression as witnessed in court through CCTV footage: 
…He [the protester] said he witnessed police attack and had seen other 
demonstrators being hit and crushed in one corner of Parliament Square. 
The jury were told the police used aggressive tactics to herd protestors into an 
area where there was no way out in a policy described as kettling. 
Footage caught [him] with his hand on a railing which was being forced 
against a police line. [He] explained his aim was to defend other people and he 
had no intention of hurting or injuring any police officer and in doing was 
clubbed over the head with a police baton. 
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He said; “one police officer was waving his baton above his head, I turned my 
back, then felt a huge blow.” 
The student required emergency brain surgery. An Independent Police 
Complaints Commission inquiry was put on hold until the trial process was 
over. It said tonight it was meeting with [the] lawyers about reopening the 
inquiry. 
Channel 4, 8 March 2013. 
 
Lastly, I return to the case of a student protester touched upon in section 2.1. The 
protester was charged with Violent Disorder on false testimony according to which 
the police officer involved in the incident had been dragged off his horse and beaten. 
The jury returned a unanimous acquittal verdict and dismissed the testimonies of nine 
police officers. We saw earlier that the narrative based on such false testimony had 
flooded mainstream media and even found its place in the Prime Minister’s statement 
(later withdrawn) calling for the “full force of the law” against those who “assault” 
police and cause damage to property. This particular case additionally exposed the 
tactic of collusion between police officers as evidenced from other cases of 
prosecution and civil suits arising from the 2010 demonstrations10. The campaigners 
in this case called for a public enquiry into the violent police tactics including the use 
of horse charges, baton strikes and containment of protesters.  
In their apology to the student, the Metropolitan Police wrote: 
I11 write with regard to the incident that occurred on 9 December 2010 during 
the course of major public disorder at a student protest. During the course of 
the protest, and following an incident when a police officer fell off his horse, 
you were struck with police batons, handcuffed and arrested for assault on 
police. You were subsequently charged with violent disorder and stood trial on 
two occasions and eventually acquitted.  
The purpose of this letter is to apologise on behalf of the Metropolitan Police 
Service for the distress and upset that you suffered as a result of your arrest.  
…On this occasion, and on the facts as known, it would appear that the level of 
service has fallen below the requisite standard and you should not have been 
arrested. 
I would therefore like to express my regret for the distress and injury that you 
suffered as a result of this failing.12 
                                                10	  Footnotes	  5,	  6	  and	  7	  give	  relevant	  information.	  	  11	  The	  letter	  was	  signed	  by	  Jill	  Horsfall,	  Chief	  Inspector,	  Directorate	  of	  Professional	  Standards.	  12	  Since	  the	  trial	  was	  concluded	  in	  2015,	  the	  letter	  has	  been	  publicly	  available,	  with	  permission	  of	  the	  student	  protester	  involved:	  http://www.defendtherighttoprotest.org/mets-­‐apology-­‐to-­‐christopher-­‐and-­‐andrew-­‐hilliard-­‐calls-­‐for-­‐a-­‐public-­‐inquiry-­‐into-­‐policing-­‐of-­‐student-­‐protests/	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The political significance of the letter cannot be underestimated. Its emergence is a 
direct consequence of painstaking campaigning to contest and re-evaluate dominant 
discourses perpetuated in the media. The types of narratives that prevailed for a long 
time were a direct consequence of the power and domination of the Government at 
pains to emphasise the violent, aggressive behaviour of the protesters, which in turn 
justified a disproportionate use of force by the police that in many cases resulted in 
serious injury to protesters as well as danger to life. Crucial to the protesters’ victory 
was the concerted deployment of language as a social power in relation to two aspects 
of the conflict: a) the specificities of the context in which the incident took place and 
the evidence available in court to show police collusion; and b) the assiduous work of 
campaigners and activists in helping to redefine received meanings around why the 
demonstrations occurred in the first place.  We see here that meanings produced 
earlier around assault and violence in a new situation generate quite different, new, 
meanings. These negate the Government’s case and open up opportunities for new 
discourses where the conduct and role of the police can be questioned from a position 
of strength; such alternative narratives then continue to influence changes in the 
dynamics of power relations between protestors, police, government and media which 
ultimately help to create the possibility for the subsequent acquittal. 
I hope that the reader is able to see the value of examining this episode of student 
protest by applying some elements of Voloshinov’s framework. The material drawn 
on here has enabled us to study the dynamics of a contest between competing political 
narratives on the role of the police in society. 
3.0 Relevance of Voloshinov to contemporary debates in philosophy of language 
Attempts by several Radical Contextualists and integrationists to challenge some 
aspects of the longstanding Gricean position on utterance meaning in context (and its 
consequences for the theory of mind) should in my view be acknowledged as a 
positive step toward greater integration between theories of language and theories of 
communication in general. This paper has attempted to offer a contribution to this 
debate through the analysis of a particular case study which allows us to introduce the 
position on word meaning outlined by Voloshinov. The case study of narrative and 
counternarrative around the 2010 student protests demonstrates a dynamic socio-
politically driven process of (re)evaluation of language use in particular situations. On 
that basis, I have argued that the indefinitely changing character of word meanings 
can only be accounted for by describing the type of situation in question. One of the 
consequences of this approach is that discourse (in the sense of concrete utterances in 
context) ‘absorbs’ relevant aspects of its context of use, thereby ‘fusing’ with its 
context and generating new contextual senses which can, in turn, following 
Voloshinov (1986: 83-106), be re-deployed, re-contextualised and re-evaluated 
(positively or negatively) in ensuing social encounters. Accordingly, from the position 
of contemporary philosophy of language, this approach would entail a complete 
elimination of the distinction between de Saussure’s ‘langue’ and ‘parole’, and so an 
abandonment of ‘types’ in favour of particular uses.  
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Arguably, this is a good starting point to begin to incorporate into contemporary 
debates Voloshinov’s critique of approaches which see language as a stable system of 
“normatively identical forms”, and which are only useful perhaps for instructional 
purposes, thus removed from the inherently social context of language use. 
Voloshinov adds that this kind of abstraction is “not adequate to the concrete reality 
of language” (1986: 94). To show further the importance Voloshinov attributes to the 
language of ‘real life’, it is worth quoting him in full (1986: 95): 
Any utterance, no matter how weighty and complete in and of itself, is only a 
moment in the continuous process of verbal communication. But that continuous 
verbal communication is, in turn, itself only a moment in the continuous, all 
inclusive, generative process of a given social collective. 
Voloshinov recognises the complexities in explaining the connection between 
interactions via utterances on the one hand and that of the “extraverbal” situation 
(both the immediate situation and the broader situation) on the other. These 
connections are unstable and diverse because different factors are at play or in focus 
in different situations with consequences for how concrete meanings will be formed 
and altered in such situations: He continues (1986: 95): 
Verbal communication can never be understood and explained outside of this 
connection with a concrete situation. Verbal intercourse is inextricably 
interwoven with communication of other types, all stemming from the common 
ground of production of communication… Language acquires life and 
historically evolves precisely here, in concrete verbal communication, and not 
in the abstract linguistic system of language forms, nor in the individual psyche 
of speakers.  
Previous sections have attempted to provide an illustration of the application of such a 
position: different textual extracts have indicated an evolving and ever-changing use 
of language, largely stemming from a “production of communication” (Voloshinov 
1986: 95) in fluctuating political contexts.  
This particular area of enquiry (i.e. the role of ideology and social consciousness in 
examining fluxes in language use) has not made itself felt in any contemporary 
philosophical framework’, whether on the Contextualist or Integrationist side 
discussed in this paper or in approaches more akin to Ideal Language Philosophy (e.g. 
Minimalism, namely advocated by Bach (cf. 1999, 2004) and Borg (cf. 2007)). This 
element is a powerful component of Voloshinov’s work, however, and it is distinctly 
historical materialist in nature. If we accept his position that human consciousness 
does not exist without socially organised individuals who communicate through the 
use of signs, then perhaps it is relatively straightforward to see how both ideology and 
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human consciousness, as inherently social phenomena, are interconnected with the 
ways in which we use those signs and consequently language itself (Collins 2000).13 
Nevertheless, there are clear points of possible compatibility and convergence 
between Voloshinov’s position and the Radical Contextualist and Integrationist 
positions. If from Radical Contextualism we take away the central message that 
context of use must take primacy in any theory of language, then we are in a stronger 
position to argue for the socio-political significance of language and critically 
examine how forms of speaking alter within and between social groups in a changing 
and developing world. Similarly, the ‘radical indeterminacy’ principle of 
Integrationism highlights the fact that the forms and meanings of utterances are 
always contested, always ‘up for grabs’ in the concrete context of language use. Both 
such approaches would lend themselves to the critical exposure of the ways in which 
the language of powerful minorities is intended to marginalise subordinate 
communicative forms and meanings and to impose those minority forms in the 
management of society. Since language use holds such strong power in terms of the 
impact on social change, it is the duty of critical language researchers to place social 
and historical contexts of verbal interaction at the centre of their study.   
4.0 Conclusion 
In closing, this paper has sought to engage the reader in key aspects of Voloshinov’s 
philosophy of language by illustrating its relevance for examples that the reader might 
still consider current. Consequently the reader can detect the importance and value in 
rescuing the ‘social’ in language theories, for two reasons: firstly, to contribute to 
linguistic and pragmatic studies of language and, secondly, to alert the reader to the 
relevance for contemporary debates in the philosophy of language of the Marxist 
conception of language which challenges us to engage with and contest the injustices 
so prevalent in the world yet so skilfully masked by the dominant narratives around 
us. We hope to have illustrated therefore the use-value of language and the 
significance of engaging with the language of ‘actual life’. 
In terms of current debates, we have highlighted the issues at stake over meaning and 
context between Radical Contextualism and Integrationism. Radical Contextualism 
has, it seems, come close to the Integrationist approaches which have met such 
resistance in academic circles for the significant challenges they pose not only to 
contemporary philosophies of language but also to those scholars who have broadly 
adopted a ‘segregational’ (decontextualized) view of linguistic systems underlying 
linguistic behaviour. Whether words have a communicational value which is unique 
to particular interactional contexts (Integrationism) or whether they contribute 
something that might be called a pre-existing ‘semantic potential’ to an ongoing 
communicative act (Radical Contextualism) appears to be a line that demarcates the 
two positions. Nonetheless, we hope to have shown that there are sufficient parallels 
between the two approaches to afford opportunities for productive dialogue. More 
                                                13	  We	  note	  however	  that	  the	  whole	  field	  of	  Critical	  Discourse	  Analysis	  (CDA)	  (e.g.	  Fairclough	  1992;	  Wodak	  and	  Meyer	  2001)	  and	  the	  work	  of	  Jones	  and	  Collins	  (e.g.	  2010)	  deal	  with	  this	  area	  of	  enquiry;	  Jones	  (e.g.	  2011)	  specifically	  taking	  up	  the	  Integrationist	  position. 
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particularly, we hope to have re-vitalized this debate by giving Voloshinov’s 
pioneering ‘ Marxist philosophy of language’ the central place it deserves within the 
study of language in context. The significance of Voloshinov’s contribution to 
contemporary debates is that it directs us towards political struggle and social conflict 
as the most important dimension and driving force in the linguistic ‘construction of 
context’ at specific conjunctures, a dimension which Radical Contextualism and 
Integrationism have tended to ignore. A ‘confrontation’ between Voloshinov’s 
‘Marxist philosophy of language’, Radical Contextualism and Integrationism may 
therefore help to expose and illuminate the theoretical limitations of the latter while at 
the same time amplifying, concretising and, possibly, correcting the former through a 
grounding in more general communicational principle.  
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